1. The offer Defendant delivered an offer to its General Manager on
December 14, 1990 the subject of which offer was the Revised PW4056 Engine
Support Proposal. As the reference shows, this partly amended the offer of
November 9, 1990 with the same subject, and partly included the Guarantee Plan
attachment of the PW4000 series engines. The offer clearly refers to those
negotiations carried out earlier, with reference to which the Plaintiff "is
pleased to submit this revised Proposal in Support of MALEV Hungarian
Airlines' acquisition of two firm ordered and one option 767-200ER aircraft,
powered by Pratt & Whitney PW4056 engines, as well as one new firm ordered
and one new option PW4056 spare engines, all scheduled for delivery as shown
in Attachment I." The introduction of the offer gives the particulars of the
technical and other advantages of said engines, including the most prominent
technical characteristic of the PW4000 engine, the Full Authority Digital
Electronic Control (FADEC) reminding to the fact that the PW4000 series are
the only engines that FADEC is used for every wide bodied aircraft. In order
to encourage the customer to choose the PW4056 engine, the offerer guaranteed
different financial
support, engine warranties, product maintenance and service facilities. It
attached engine warranties under Annex B. Within the framework of the chapter
containing introduction support credit the Plaintiff offered to credit the
customer's balance with $3,100,000 after each of the 767200ER aircraft
described in the offer, a total of $6,200,000 in order to facilitate for the
customer to introduce said aircraft equipped with PW4056 engines. In order to
facilitate for the customer to expand its 767-200ER fleet with the 767-200 ER
aircraft described in the offer and equipped with the optional PW4056, the
offeror credits the customer's balance with the amount of $8,500,000. As a
spare engine credit, the offeror offered to credit the full price of the first
new PW4056 spare engine in the value of $6,300,000. In addition to the above,
the offer includes Spare Engine QEC Credit, Maintenance Facility Credit, Al
Line Stations Spare Parts Credit, and Engine Condition Monitoring Kit Credit
Facilities. With regard to this latter it emphasizes that the customer's
balance would be credited with $75,000 "for each of the four PW4056 engines
and one spare PW4056 engine of the proposal." Para. W of the offer states that
the basic price of the new PW4056 spare engine is $5,847,675.
Para. Y of the offer entitled "Purchase Agreements" states that the customer
buys and the seller sells two new PW4056 engines according to the attached
schedule to be mounted to the 767-200ER aircraft and two additional new
PW40S6 engines in case if the option granted for an additional 767-200ER
aircraft is exercised. According to para. 4 of the sales agreement the buyer
thereby places a firm and unconditional order with the offerer for one new
PW4056 spare engine which will be delivered also according to the schedule
attached. Pursuant to para. 5 of the sales agreement the buyer agrees that the
accepted offer constitutes a valid, binding and legally enforceable agreement
for the purchase and sale of the new PW4056 engines and spare engines
described therein. The seller pointed out that it fixes the deadline for
buyer's statement of acceptance until December 21, 1990. It proposed that if
buyer had any questions with regard to the offer, its experts would personally
be at disposal. Finally, the offer stated that the effect of buyer's statement
of acceptance is subject to the approval of the governments of Hungary and
the USA, respectively.
In the document attached under Exhibit 2.D. according to the record
dated from December 21, 1990 the Plaintiff extended the former offer to the
PW4060 engine by the following words: "5.(a) Conditions of the present proposal
shall also be applied if MALEV chooses to purchase PW4060 engine."
2. The extension of the offer According to the proof of the
documents attached under Exhibit 2.E-J, Plaintiff proposed to Defendant also
on December 14, 1990 to deliver PW4152 and PW4156/A engines as well. This was
the supporting proposal relating to the abovementioned engines dated from
November 9, 1990. Plaintiff here also refers to the result of the former
negotiations fixing the purpose of supporting the Defendant in purchasing the
two firmly ordered and one optional A310-300 aircraft equipped with PW4152 or
PW4156/A engine and one new firmly ordered and one new optional PW4152 or
PW4156/A spare engine according to the schedule attached. The text and
conditions of the offer conform with the offer detailed above under para. 1
with the exception that para. W entitled "the Price of the spare engine"
states that the unit basic price established for the new PW4152 is
$5,552,675, whilst the unit base price of each firmly ordered new
PW4156/A spare engine is $5,847,675. In the conditions of sale the
Plaintiff pointed out that the deadline of validity of this offer will be also
December 21, 1990 for the buyer.
This offer was completed with the letter dated from December 20, 1990
which explains with reference of the above offer that in case if Defendant
chose Airbus A310-300 aircraft for the expansion of its wide-bodied fleet,
Plaintiff, the deliverer would increase the initial fleet expansion credit
facilities by the amount of $1 million for each aircraft.
Exhibits 2.F-J. are the annexes of the abovementioned offer relating
to the PW4152 and PW5156/A engines about Service Policy, the Summary of
Service Policy Support, description of the engines, reliability of the
engines, the Price Escalation Formula, and the Standard Conditions and Terms
of Sale, referring each time to the PW4000 engine series.
Under Exhibit 13 the Plaintiff attached the technical charts and
diagrams providing detailed technical data of the PW4000 series.
Under Exhibit 2.B Plaintiff attached the offer relating to the PW4000
series turbofan engines addressed to the Defendant about Plaintiff's Service
Policy together with the Annex containing the Guarantee Plan addressed to the
Defendant on December 14, 1990.
3. With respect to the two offers and the extension and completion
of same detailed under paras. 1 and 2 above the court established that they
conform with relevant provisions of the applicable law designated jointly by
the parties. According to Article 14, para. 1 of the Vienna Convention on the
International Trade of Goods promulgated by Law Decree 20 of 1987 and
repeatedly referred to by both parties, a proposal for a contract addressed to
one or more definite person can be regarded as an offer if it is adequately
specified and it indicates the offerer's intention to bind itself by it in
case of its acceptance. According to the above-cited provision the proposal is
adequately defined if it indicates the goods and fixes the quantity and the
price expressly or according to the sense, or contains provisions for the
definition of same.
According to the court's opinion in the present case it is obvious
that the addressee of Plaintiff's proposal is the Defendant. Therefore,
the court had to examine during the process of evidence if the proposals
detailed above can be regarded adequately defined, that is if they indicate
the goods, that is the subject of sale, or not. According to the court's
view this is beyond doubt either, since one of the offers and its extension
(Exhibit 2.A and 2.D) unambiguously indicate the PW4056 and PW4060 engine,
while the other offer, or rather its extension (Exhibits 2.E-2.J)
unambiguously indicates the PW4152 and PW4156/A engines. Each of these
belongs to the PW4000 series. According to the court's opinion, therefore,
the proposal leaves no doubt about its subject, that is it indicates
unambiguously the goods subject of this sale. The proper indication of the
goods is not affected by the condition that according to the proposal the
buyer could choose from among the enumerated engines depending on the fact
if it were to choose BOEING 767-200ER aircraft which would require PW4056 or
PW4060 engine, or Airbus A310-300, both being wide-bodied aircraft, which
would require PW4152 or PW4156/A engine. According to the court the proposal
allowed unilateral power to the buyer in respect of its choice of engines
depending on its decision on the type of aircraft. The 'unilateral power'
is not unusual in legal and commercial practice; it is a rather frequently
applied method which affects seller's position considerably and means a
significant favor to the buyer. The court, therefore, did not hold conclusive
those repeated allegations of the Defendant according to which the provision
of Article 14, para. (1) of the Convention relating to the indication of the
price had not been fulfilled, consequently the proposal could not be regarded
as an offer. The proposals attached and described in detail above together
with the correspondence of the parties attached by the Plaintiff under Exhibit
12 unambiguously prove that there was no doubt in the parties as regards
the goods being the subject matter of their negotiations.
Defendant's allegation is likewise not conclusive as regards its
statement that Plaintiff's proposals could not be regarded as an offer because
they do not establish the quantity. This argumentation of the Defendant
is all the more unacceptable, since the Plaintiff ensured unilateral power
to the buyer also with respect to the quantity, obviously as an expression
of the above detailed interests.
Defendant was able to define the quantity on basis of Plaintiff's
proposal depending on how many aircraft it would purchase. Depending on the
number of aircraft purchased, it could not be doubted that two engines must be
considered for each aircraft besides the firmly defined pieces of spare
engines for each aircraft. In this respect the court found Plaintiff's
reasoning set forth in its preparatory document No. 2 (para. 27) fully
founded stating that it is perfectly unambiguous that the Defendant
intended to purchase two aircrafts regardless if it were BOEING or Airbus,
while it had right of option for an additional aircraft. If the Defendant does
not use its right of option, the quantity to which Plaintiff's offer relates
is four engines and one spare engine, a total of five engines, whilst
if it does, the quantity in question is six engines and one spare
engine.
In the court's opinion that allegation of the Defendant is also
unfounded according to which Plaintiff's proposal could not be regarded as an
offer because it does not indicate the price. This allegation of the
Defendant is biased and false. According to documentary evidence the price
of the PW4056 engine is $5,847,675 and the price of the PW4152 and PW4156/A
engine is $5,552,675 as the above enumerated offers and their completions
detailed under paras. 1 and 2 unambiguously indicate. These proposals were
so much definite that they even included different credit facilities as well,
also they defined those rates for the services by the help of which
the counter value of the services can be calculated.
In addition to the abovementioned, Plaintiff's proposals included
in every aspect the deadlines for delivery as well, thus these could not
be uncertain either before the Defendant.
Considering the abovementioned the court established that Plaintiff's
proposal addressed to the Defendant on December 14, 1990 qualifies as an
offer beyond doubt since it is adequately defined due to the fact that,
besides ensuring unilateral power, it unambiguously indicated the price,
as well as the quantity of the goods and also established the
price according to the sense and the deadlines as well. Hence, according
to the court's opinion Plaintiff's proposal satisfied every requirement of the
provisions of Article 14, para. (1) of the cited Convention.
4. The acceptance. Defendant addressed a letter of acceptance to the
Plaintiff on December 21, 1990 within the deadline determined in
Plaintiff's offer (Exhibit 3.A). In the letter of acceptance Defendant
informed the Plaintiff that it had chosen the PW4000 engine for its new
fleet of wide-boded [sic] aircraft. It even explained the reasons for its
decision, namely that such decision had been based on technical and economical
evaluation. The letter of acceptance even gives details of the technical and
economical advantages pointing out that the credit facilities granted by the
Plaintiff for the introduction of PW4000 engine were essential in bringing
such decision.
The letter unambiguously stated that it was based in every respect on the
terms and conditions included in the proposal for PW engines dated from
December 14, 1990. Defendant added only that it requests to treat the
letter confidentially until the parties make a joint public announcement. Such
a request does not mean a difference of opinion with respect to para. Y.6 of
Plaintiff's offer whereby the Defendant agrees for the Plaintiff to publish a
press release announcing Defendant's choice of engine.
In order to judge if Defendant's letter can be regarded as an acceptance,
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention had to be examined. According to para.
1
of Article 18 an acceptance is the statement of the addressee of the offer
aiming acceptance or its attitude indicating acceptance. It is beyond doubt
that the above cited statement of the Defendant is totally unambiguous with
respect to the acceptance. When judging the request at the end of
Defendant's letter of acceptance the court originated its evaluation from the
provision of para. 1 of Article 19 of the Convention which says that if the
answer to an offer indicating acceptance contains amendments, restrictions, or
other changes, it means the refusal of the offer and is to be regarded as a
new offer. According to the court's opinion neither of the cases enumerated
relate to the present case, since Defendant's simple request cannot be
considered as an amendment, restriction, or other change, moreover it
expresses Defendant's intention to participate in the communication of the
press release claimed by the Plaintiff under para. Y.6 and prepares for a
joint public announcement. Hence, if this cannot be regarded as the
amendment, restriction, or changes referred to by Article 19, para. 1, then
Defendant's answer means clearly acceptance
which was competent to bring about the contract with the contents of
Plaintiff's offer of December 14, 1990.
With regard to the abovementioned the court described totally unfounded
Defendant's argumentation claiming that its statement of December 21, 1990
could only be considered as a letter of intent.
5. During the procedure neither of the parties commented in the merits
on that condition of Plaintiff's offer following the provision determining the
deadline of the offer, according to which "MALEV's acceptance of this proposal
is conditional upon the appropriate approvals of the governments of Hungary
and the United States", or rather they regarded it as a suspensive condition
under Hungarian law, and they presented their respective argumentation
accordingly.
In this respect both parties' argumentation is misconstructed. In
judging the question, here also, the court had to examine the provisions of
the Vienna Convention which the parties unanimously designated as applicable
substantial law. Pursuant to Article 23 of the Convention a contract
becomes valid when, under the terms of the Convention, the acceptance
of the offer comes into force. According to para. 2 of Article 18 the
acceptance of an offer comes into force as soon as the offeror received the
notification of acceptance.
In the court's estimation these provisions clearly lead to the
conclusion that the present contract became valid between the parties
when Plaintiff received Defendant's letter of acceptance, or to put it
in another way, when Plaintiff received Defendant's letter of acceptance to
its detailed offer accepting all the aspects of said offer, a contract was
concluded between the parties.
The court notes here, that none of the parties contested during the
procedure that Plaintiff's offer of December 14, 1990 was received by the
Defendant on the same day and that Defendant's letter of acceptance dated from
December 21, 1990 was also received by the Plaintiff on the same day. This
fact seemed quite realistic under the circumstances that the parties both
claimed to have carried on direct negotiations in person, not to mention the
highly developed communicational facilities that can be applied nowadays.
Besides what has been mentioned above, neither has the acceptance been
withdrawn in conformity with Article 22 of the Convention, therefore,
Defendant's written statements dated from several months later could not be
estimated as such a withdrawal. These statements of the Defendant could be
estimated by the court at the best as initiatives to terminate the contract.
With regard to the type of contract the provisions of Article
3, para. (1) of the Convention were to be taken into consideration. In
pursuance of such provisions the contracts relating to the future
manufacturing or production of goods qualify as sales contract.
Exceptions listed by the provision and para. 2, like the prevalence of
entrepreneurial elements, were out of the question, consequently in terms of
the Convention this sale corresponds to the sales contract under Hungarian
law.
Returning to the "condition" and evaluating its legal nature the court
started from the following.
Several provisions of the Hungarian Civil Law contains rules relating
to the conditions of concluding an agreement, among them the institution of
official approval. According to Section 215, para. (1) of the Hungarian Civil
Code if the conclusion of an agreement necessitates the approval of a third
person, or official approval, the contract does not come into force
until the obtainment of such approval, however, the parties are bound by
their statements. Pursuant to Section 228, para. (1) of the Civil Code if the
parties made the coming into force of the agreement dependent on an
uncertain future event (suspensive or delaying condition), the agreement comes
into force by the fulfillment of such condition. According to para. (2), if
the parties made the termination of the force of the agreement
dependent on an uncertain future event (condition of termination), the
fulfillment of the condition will bring about the cessation of the force of
the agreement. The Convention does not know such conditions, does
not enumerate such conditions, thus the conclusion of the agreement
cannot be connected with such conditions. Accordingly, the agreement in
question has been concluded in compliance with the abovementioned and it is a
sales agreement.
On the other hand, the Convention does not restrict in general the
parties' right of disposition, neither did it restrict it in this respect,
therefore Plaintiff could rightfully apply in its offer the above cited
condition: "MALEV's acceptance of this proposal is conditional upon the
appropriate approvals of the governments of Hungary and the United States."
The interpretation of the condition, however, must originate from the
fact that an agreement is considered concluded according to relevant
provisions of the Convention when the acceptance of the offer comes into
force, however, the acceptance of the offer comes into force when the
notification of acceptance is received by the offerer. The parties could
not ignore these cogent rules of the provisions in spite of the fact that
they were otherwise free to set the terms and conditions of the contract.
It became well evident during the evidence that Plaintiff's intentions
were aimed at introducing the condition excluding the eventual termination of
the contract and not that of preventing the conclusion of the same. This
is confirmed by the fact that the Plaintiff was expecting decisions of the
Defendant promoting the fulfillment of the agreement (e.g. decision on the
choice of aircraft, and accordingly the supply of specifications).
According to the correct interpretation the Plaintiff did not make the
force of Defendant's letter of acceptance depend on the above-cited
condition, as it was not in the position to do so under the imperative
provisions detailed above, but the fulfillment of the contract from
Plaintiff's part.
Plaintiff, who did not have yet the necessary information on the Hungarian
economic administration in transformation and the changing rules of economy
back at the end of 1990, obviously did not stipulate "the necessary approval"
of the Hungarian Government to make the conclusion of the agreement depend on
it, but rather in order to avoid the possible infringement of any Hungarian
provision of law or governmental measure. This is also confirmed by the
stipulation that, evidently aiming to reinforce its position in the
international market, Plaintiff requested Defendant's consent to the immediate
public announcement of the agreement.
In course of the procedure it turned out that Defendant's firm is an
independent company owned by the State which makes its decisions
independently and such decisions do not depend on the approval of its
founding authorities. Although the Ministry of Transportation, Communication
and Construction made a statement in connection with this case, such statement
indicated the lack of interference in the decision and developed a legal
standpoint only with regard to the conclusion of the agreement. Even more
obvious than the abovementioned is the fact that Plaintiff meant by the
necessary approval of the Government of the USA only the issuance of the
export license which on the other hand is a precondition of the
conclusion of the agreement and also that the parties be ready to fulfill
their obligations as soon as such license is granted.
In summary of the above, therefore, it could be established that the parties
agreed in the terminating condition and not in the suspensive or delaying
condition according to the terminology of the Hungarian
Civil Code as regards the initiative in Plaintiff's offer. Taking into
consideration all the above the court established that a valid agreement
has been made between the parties.
VIII.
1. During the evidence the court did not honor Defendant's motion to
oblige the Plaintiff attach the document on the price of PW4000 engine, for
the court established that Defendant's defense is groundless in claiming that
no contract has been concluded between the parties as the proposal did not
include the definition of prices. According to the abovementioned reasons the
price of the proposed engines was beyond question, therefore, the court deemed
it unnecessary to conduct evidence in this matter.
The court also denied Defendant's motion to oblige the Plaintiff to attach
the translations of its contracts concluded with ANA Japanese Airlines and
Indian Airlines. The court estimated the review of these contracts irrelevant
from the point of view of the present case.
Likewise, the court refused Defendant's motion to conduct evidence
with respect to the circumstances under which the letter of December 21, 1990
signed by Defendant's General Manager and CEO came into existence. The court
deemed such evidence unnecessary and held the interpretation of the letter its
own duty, which it did according to the aforementioned. In possession of a
definite, written statement the court held the accompanying circumstances of
the signature irrelevant.
The court found that motion of Defendant unprecedented in its practice and
also irrelevant with respect to the present case which aimed at the
court's taking a statement of the Plaintiff about its purpose with the present
declaratory suit. The fact that Plaintiff's purpose with respect to the
present lawsuit as well as its second step planned is not clear before the
Defendant cannot serve as a reason to such examination.
The court denied Plaintiff's motion of evidence to hear Mr. Thomas Hajek as a
witness who conducted the negotiations carried out with the Defendant from
Plaintiff's side. The court deemed the evidence provided and detailed above
satisfactory for the foundation of its abovementioned decision.
The court dismissed Plaintiff's and Defendant's concordant
motion to have the
court order the attachment of the contract concluded between MALEV and BOEING.
The court estimated such contract irrelevant from the aspect of the present
case.
On the other hand, on basis of the concordant motion of Plaintiff and the
Defendant, the court ordered to conduct evidence with respect to the
negotiations that went on between December 16 through 21, 1990 between the
parties. However, the court did not wish to take evidence by examining
depositions, but ordered the Plaintiff to provide records, minutes, memos and
other similar documents of such negotiations together with the Hungarian
translation of same. The court, on the other hand, ordered the Defendant in
this respect to make a statement with regard to the completeness of the
documents attached by Plaintiff (if the documents attached by Plaintiff
include all the documents) or does the Defendant possess any further such
documents. The court deemed necessary to examine the parties' statements in
order to establish if the statements made during the negotiations modified,
and in the positive, to what extent, Plaintiff's offer of December 14, 1990 or
the Defendant's letter of acceptance dated from December 21, 1990.
2. In the scope of evidence ordered by the court in view of what has been
mentioned above, the Plaintiff attached a certified translation of Exhibit 2/D
which includes Plaintiff's statement of December 21, 1990 and the expansion of
the original offer to the PW4060 engine. Plaintiff attached under Exhibit 10
the so called Amendment No. 1 dated from December 20, 1990 which includes that
if Defendant chose Airbus A310-300 aircraft, Plaintiff would increase the
credit package described by paras B and C of the original offer by $1 million
after each aircraft.
The court evaluated these documents before bringing its decision according to
the manner detailed above.
Before the hearing Defendant attached to its counterclaim (32/A/ 1)
Plaintiff's letter of November 12, 1990 as amended on December 21, 1990 under
No. A-C/1 with a certified Hungarian translation. This letter contains the
conditions of the so called signing bonus. To this evidence Defendant
attributed such a meaning according to which since the Plaintiff did not
transfer the signing bonus to Defendant's behalf, this would prove that
Plaintiff did not consider its letter dated from December 21, 1990 as a
contract. The court established that Defendant's interpretation of this letter
is mistaken. Plaintiff's letter is totally unambiguous in the sense that
Plaintiff opens this signing additional credit as of December 15, 1990 as soon
as it receives Defendant's written notification about the latter's order of an
aircraft described in one of the abovementioned proposals. According to the
information at hand, Defendant did not issue such an order for any aircraft
until December 15, 1990, neither until December 21, consequently Plaintiff
could reasonably conclude the delay in ordering the aircraft instead of the
invalidity of Defendant's statement of acceptance of December 21, 1990.
Defendant also attached to its counterclaim under Exhibit A-C/2
Plaintiff's letter dated from February 11, 1991 and interpreted the
contents of this letter also in a way according to which the contract
concluded by Defendant's statement of December 21, 1990 was not considered
valid by the Plaintiff either. The letter confirms those subjects which were
negotiated in New York the previous week. The letter states in detail that the
$65,000 promotion budget will be added to the signing bonus, furthermore, that
Plaintiff will help the Defendant in choosing the maintenance partner and
co-operate in the establishment of Line Maintenance Sparepart Pool in
Budapest.
Only after confirmation of the contents and an expression of courtesy follows
that part of the letter which relates to the negotiations about the
re-engining of TU 154 aircraft and the finalization of the PW4000 contract.
The court established that Defendant's conclusion attached to the second half
of the letter is mistaken and the letter's contents are not suitable to raise
any doubts with respect to the validity of the sales agreement concluded by
Defendant's letter of acceptance. According to the court's view, the correct
interpretation of the letter's meaning is that the parties have carried on
negotiations in Budapest in the subjects confirmed by the letter, namely the
promotion budget and the engine maintenance partner and the establishment of
the Line Maintenance Sparepart Pool and complete in these respects the
contract relating to the PW4000 engine.
Finally, Defendant attached to its counterclaim (Exhibit 32.A/1) under A-C/3
the letter addressed by Mr. J.M. Schoefield to Mr. Barna Tarnoczi, personal
secretary of Defendant's General Manager dated from December 20, 1990.
Defendant attached said letter with the intention to verify that Defendant's
statement of acceptance dated from December 21 was not even mentioned on
December 20. Defendant did not attach the certified Hungarian translation
thereof, however, Plaintiff's interpreter present in the hearing communicated
the Hungarian meaning of the text. The court attached this sound-recorded
Hungarian translation to the records of the hearing under 32/1. The court
established in connection with the letter that it does not bear any
significance at all with respect to the sales contract concluded between the
parties. The letter was addressed by Plaintiff's representative to the
personal secretary of Defendant's General Manager and CEO thanking for the
former's stay in Budapest. The fact that Plaintiff's representative thanks for
the hospitality he was extended to Plaintiff's delegation by the addressee and
other Hungarian business and government officials in Budapest and the fact
that the letter did not mention Defendant's statement of acceptance issued on
December 21, the next day, does not mean that no such statement of acceptance
has been made, quite the contrary has been proven as a matter of fact. The
addressee of the letter and its contents clearly show that Plaintiff's
representative made a statement independent of the contract to be concluded
and it is totally absurd to conclude from his statement that the letter's not
mentioning the parties' sales contract would have the least legal effect.
3. Defendant's representative represented in the hearing that he agreed with
Plaintiff in that no further document has been drafted in connection with the
negotiations between December 16 and 21, 1990 besides the two documents
attached to his counterclaim.
The court examined the evidence conducted with respect to these negotiations
and evaluated it according to the abovementioned.
Defendant represented in its counterclaim (32.A/1) that Plaintiff's complaint
can be dismissed solely based on legal argumentation on basis of the documents
at hand, hence no further evidence is necessary in the case. This
representation was repeated by Defendant's representative during the hearing,
therefore the court decided to finish the evidence with respect to the main
subject of the lawsuit. The parties unanimously stated that they have no
further motion and representation in connection with evidence.
4. The court established that further evidence is necessary in the subject of
Plaintiff's claim with regard to the Defendant's obligation to reimburse
Plaintiff's costs incurred in connection with the discovery procedure
initiated by the Defendant. Plaintiff did not attach the permission of the
foreign exchange authorities to the expansion of its complaint aiming its
damages, and it could not determine the final amount of its claim for damages
during the hearing.
Due to the abovementioned the court has brought the present partial
judgment
and will continue the evidence in the subject of procedural costs and
Plaintiff's claim for damages.
Done in Budapest, on this 10th day of January, 1992.
Signature of
Dr. Sndor Piskolti
Judge
Rubber stamp #40 of the
Metropolitan Court of Budapest
Authenticated by
Ms. Olga Ligner
FOOTNOTE
[1] case translation was prepared by Dr. and Mrs.
László Szlávinits. Dr. László Szlávnits was the attorney for the Plaintiff.
Any reader who intends to rely on this case must consult the original text, a
copy of which can be obtained from the Journal of Law &
Commerce.
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