[1] The bulk of the district court's opinion focuses on whether the plaintiffs are “prevailing parties” entitled to a fee award under [[section]] 1988. On appeal, defendants do not contest the district court's finding that plaintiffs prevailed for the purposes of [[section]] 1988.

[2] Subsection (a)(1) of Rule 41 provides for automatic dismissal of a complaint, without court order, in two circumstances: (1) upon the plaintiff's filing of a notice of dismissal, provided that the defendant has not yet filed either (a) an answer or (b) a motion for summary judgment; or (2) upon the filing of a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties to the action. Because the defendants had already filed a motion for summary judgment, and because defendant C.V. Landfill apparently did not join the stipulation of dismissal, Rule 41(a)(1) is inapplicable here.

[3] Part II.A of this opinion was circulated to the active members of the Court prior to filing.

[4] Santiago was decided three years after White, and distinguished that case on the grounds that a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41 is qualititatively different from the entry of a consent judgment, since a district judge is permitted either to reserve jurisdiction or to attach conditions (e.g., for the award of attorneys' fees) only to the latter. Absent the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Cooter & Gell, then, White would not provide grounds for overruling Santiago. Taken together, however, we find the two cases determinative.

[5] A district court certainly has the power to approve or disapprove a settlement agreement conditionally—thereby giving the parties an opportunity to insert a provision that the court believes necessary or to remove a provision to which it objects.