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Reproduced from the CISG-Australia website. Reproduced with permission of 6 Journal of Contract Law, North Ryde NSW, Australia (1993) 123-150
Jacob S Ziegel [**]
- Introduction
- Object of exercise
- Evaluating the comparative merits of the different sales regimes
- What do the agreements say?
- The role of default rules
- Where does the Vienna Convention fit into this scheme?
Introduction
Professor Carter has done an admirable job of comparing the rejection and termination of
contract rules in the British Sale of Goods Act, the International Sales Convention and, to a lesser
extent, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The gaps in the Article 2 coverage are more
than adequately filled in Professor Speidel's sophisticated paper. Canadian law is only lightly
touched on in Professor Carter's paper, which some will regret. Canada was one of the first, if
not the first, common law jurisdiction to address the problems of express and implied warranties
and the use of disclaimer clauses in the sale of agricultural machinery, and to breach the walls of
privity in imposing warranty liability on the manufacturer of such equipment in favour of the
ultimate buyer.[1] I could also quibble with some of the analyses and conclusions drawn in Professor Carter's paper
but this would be unrewarding. I should like instead to focus on some broader questions --
questions, I believe, that need to be addressed in determining the effectiveness and suitability of
older and modern sales law regimes. I hope I am not being naive in asking this simple question: what particular purpose did Professor
Carter have in mind in comparing the British, Article 2 and CISG sales regimes? The answer, I
think, matters because it will enable us to determine whether Professor Carter has achieved his
objective. Three purposes come to mind: (a) the intrinsic intellectual interest of comparing
different regimes in a gathering such as this; (b) to predict the parties', particularly the buyer's,
reactions to the rejection and termination provisions in the Convention; and (c) to evaluate the
comparative merits of the three sales regimes, again principally from the buyer's perspective. In view of the conclusions at the end of Professor Carter's paper,[2] the first purpose seems unlikely
though not wholly implausible. [page 123] After all, journals of comparative law are replete with
articles that have no higher objective than to compare legal rules, doctrines and institutions in two
or more jurisdictions. However, among modern scholars there is increasing scepticism about the
value of such exercises unless they are also linked to some normative bench marks (such as the
efficiency of national and international rules in the commercial law areas or the design of
alternative routes to accomplish similar goals) or to explain the impact of cultural, economic or
political forces on the evolution of legal rules. The second purpose suggested above -- to predict buyer's reactions to the Convention's rejection
and termination rules -- seems to be what Professor Carter had in mind. However, it ascribes a
mistaken purpose because the Convention was not designed to offer a superior sales regime in
place of inferior national regimes, although it may have that effect in some cases. The primary
objectives of the Convention were to substitute an easily ascertainable choice of law rule
governing international sales contracts in place of the multiplicity of frequently uncertain choice
of law rules (or, in the case of many developing countries, no choice of law rules at all) found
among the world's 100 or more trading nations and, second, to provide the parties with a
'neutral' sales law where the parties were unwilling to accept the sales law of their respective
countries as the law governing the transaction. The latter objective was felt to be particularly
important in transactions between buyers and sellers located respectively in market oriented and
state regulated economies, and vice versa, or in countries with developed and developing
economies. Given the Convention's rationales, the answer to the question whether the buyer in a common law
jurisdiction will opt to be governed by the Convention is surely predictable. Assuming the choice
lies with him (frequently because of the supplier's stronger bargaining position it will not be), he
will choose the law with which he is most familiar and whose rules are best established and most
accessible from his point of view. Often this will be the law of the buyer's principal place of
business. In the case of commodity contracts where the parties are using a standard form
agreement approved by one of the great international trading associations in London, New York,
Chicago or elsewhere, it will usually be the law where the trading association has its
headquarters. Professor Carter rightly notes that the buyer's rejection and termination rights and remedies are
substantially less generous in the Convention than they are in the British Act. They are even less
generous when compared with the Article 2 provisions. Even if this were not so, a buyer in a
sophisticated jurisdiction would have additional reasons for preferring to be governed by his own
sales law. It is a mistake, I believe, to judge a few Convention articles in isolation from the rest
of the Convention: the Convention must be judged as a package. If the buyer embarks on this additional enquiry he would quickly learn that there are other
disadvantages to using the Convention as the parties' law, assuming the buyer has a meaningful
say in the matter. Inevitably, the Convention contains significant uncertainties and ambiguities,
and it will take many years of litigation and arbitration before they are satisfactorily resolved.
[page 124] There are also important questions that are not governed by the Convention at all --
the essential validity of the contract,[3] the seller's liability for defective products causing death or
injury to a person [4] and the property effects of the contract,[5] to mention some obvious examples.
It will be an unusual buyer who will not prefer to have all possible questions determined by one
law rather than a multiplicity of laws. Evaluating the Comparative Merits of the Different Sales Regimes Reading between the lines, comparing the respective merits of the rejection and termination
provisions of the three sales regimes also appears to be one of the objects of Professor Carter's
paper. It seems to me, however, that the benchmarks he seemingly prefers, certainty and
predictability of outcomes, are too simplistic. Let me explain why. A certain and predictable rule that may favour the buyer at one level, for example, the
characterisation of the great implied terms of title, description, merchantability and fitness as
conditions in the British Act, may be neutralised by an equally stringent rule at another level, for
example, the rule that the buyer only has a very short period of time following delivery to reject
the goods on grounds of non-conformity.[6] This means that the buyer will almost never be able
to reject the goods where they suffer from a latent defect, however serious, unless there is an
express clause extending the time for examination or rejection or unless the court is willing to
read an exception into the Act. A second reason, one that lawyers often overlook, is that buyers who want strong rejection rights
will have to pay for them. There are no free lunches! Let me illustrate with a familiar set of facts.
B orders a custom made machine. The seller offers him two alternative contracts. The first gives
B a strict right of rejection for any non-trivial nonconformity; the second limits the right to major
breaches which the seller cannot cure after reasonable effort. The first alternative will cost the
buyer 10% more than the second. Which alternative will the buyer choose? This simple example also illustrates another economic truism. This is that to determine the
efficiency of sales rules we must observe their impact on the seller as well as the buyer and
ascertain, in the context of a particular breach and assuming the absence of a fully specified
contract, which of the two parties is in a better position to absorb the risk of loss arising from a
defective product and whether a strong right of rejection (as compared, for example, with a claim
for damages) will impose unacceptable allocative costs on the seller. In a seminal study,[7]
Professor George Priest has used this approach to determine whether [page 125] American
courts pursue efficiency objectives in applying the Article 2 rejection provisions and reached the
conclusion that they generally do. However, one need not be a lawyer economist to appreciate that there is something seriously
amiss with the British (and by a parity of reasoning, with the Australian and Canadian) perfect
tender rules if they can lead to such incongruous and opportunistic results as occurred in Arcos
Ltd v E A Ronaasen & Son,[8] IBM Co Ltd v Shcherban,[9] and Re Landau & Moore & Co.[10] It is
surely significant that two leading American commentators on Article 2 [11] are of the view that the
exceptions to the perfect tender rule in UCC 2-602 are as important as the rule itself. It seems to me it is also a serious error to look at the sales rules without comparing them with
what the parties themselves agree to in practice, for in the case of freely bargained agreements
(this is an important proviso) there is no better way to determine the rules' marketability.
Professor Carter claims the necessary empirical evidence is not available. He is surely mistaken.
In the 1940s Professor Honnold conducted a detailed study of the buyer's rights of rejection
under the then US law,[12] which included an examination of many institutionalised practices and
agreements. He found that the perfect tender rule was more honoured in the breach than in the
observance. In the 1970s, as part of its Report on Sale of Goods,[13] the Ontario Law Reform Commission
conducted a detailed examination of several dozen standard forms supplied by members of the
Canadian Manufacturers' Association. The results are shown below.[14] Vendor's Liability for Defective Goods and Right to Cure: Industry Clauses Key to clauses:
10
-
Liability limited to cost of goods.
11
-
Liability limited to cost of repair of goods.
12
-
Liability limited to replacement of goods.
13
-
Vendor will at his option repair or replace parts proven
defective. [page 126]
Industries using these clauses:
| Food and beverage | 10, 13 | |
| Rubber and plastic | 10, 13 | |
| Leather | 10 | |
| Knitting mills | -- | |
| Furniture and fixtures | 10 | |
| Paper | 10 | |
| Printing, publishing and allied industries | 10 | |
| Primary metal | 13 | |
| Metal fabricating | 10, 11, 12, 13 | |
| Non-electrical machinery | 10, 11, 12, 13 | |
| Electrical products | 10, 12, 13 | |
| Non-metallic mineral products | -- | |
| Petroleum and coal products | -- | |
| Chemicals | 10 | |
| Miscellaneous manufacturing | 13 |
These results, combined with the results of earlier studies, amply justify the following conclusions:
If we apply the same tests to the Convention, the Convention would emerge only marginally better than the British Act and in several respects worse. The test of 'fundamental breach' [16] as the primary basis for the buyer's right of rejection and avoidance of the contract [17] is unnecessarily obscure and arguably too demanding. [page 127] The Convention lacks a clear right to cure.[18] Also troubling is the rule that the buyer loses all rights to complain about non-conforming goods if he fails to give notice of the defect within a reasonable time after he has discovered or ought to have discovered it.[19]
Lawyer economists refer to optional rules such as those contained in the sale of goods legislation and in the Vienna Convention as default rules because they only apply where the parties have not adopted different provisions in their contract. The role of default rules is to provide the parties with a standard set of terms which will be triggered automatically in the absence of contrary contractual provisions.
The underlying assumption of all default rules is that they serve a useful purpose because they will save the parties transaction costs and because they reflect the terms the parties would themselves have selected in a substantial number of cases had they applied their minds to the question. This raises an important issue. If I am right in suggesting that many commercial sale contracts, perhaps most, deviate significantly from the remedial regimes spelled out in the sales legislation, why is it that the default rules in the Australian and Canadian Acts and, for the most part, the British Act have not been changed to reflect contemporary usage? Or, to put it more forcefully, what is the point of retaining obsolete default rules that fail to do what they are supposed to do?
This is a big enquiry and I cannot answer it satisfactorily here. Let me simply sketch some of the likely answers. Probably the most important is based on Coase's theorem.[20] This teaches us that the rules of liability do not matter as long as parties can costlessly transact around them. The fully specified sales contract matches this prescription almost perfectly since printing batches of standard form purchase or confirmation of sale forms is relatively costless.
But there are important exceptions. The buyer may refuse to sign the seller's form and instead send in his own differently worded purchase order, thus giving rise to the familiar battle of the forms. Or the terms of the contract may be incomplete or there may be no written contract at all. In all these cases the default rules will continue to apply.
So, it turns out, it is important after all to retain default rules for a significant range of cases, but the challenge remains: how do we make sure the default rules reflect the rules the parties would themselves have adopted had they applied their minds to the question? We seem to confront a Catch-22 dilemma. We assume that since the parties chose not to reduce their contract to writing, or at least not to reduce it fully to [page 128] writing, it must have been because they were satisfied with the applicable default rules. Yet we also know from the many cases where there are written contracts that the most significant default rules are often changed radically or even rejected altogether. Is it likely then that the parties' silence in the other cases implies concurrence with the statutory sales regimes? Surely not.
If this reasoning is sound then we ought not to be content with the status quo and rely on Coase's theorem: the default rules do matter and we ought to make sure that they reflect the best contemporary practices and promote allocative efficiencies. This is a tall order for, as the New South Wales Law Reform Commission pointed out in a Working Paper in the 1970s,[21] it is impossible to design a buyer's remedial regime that will be appropriate in all cases.
Nevertheless, I think we can do significantly better than the current British model. A substantial breach rule should replace the system of a priori characterisation in all but a limited number of cases, and the seller should have a broad right to cure where cure can be effected promptly and without unreasonable inconvenience to the buyer.[22] Economically wasteful and opportunistic conduct should be discouraged through the adoption of good faith requirements, though I appreciate I am walking here on contentious ground. One feels much less hesitation in recommending the adoption of a UCC 2-608 type right of revocation of acceptance for latent defects. The British rule [23] that a buyer must discover the defect within a matter of days at most or risk losing the right to reject altogether is too draconian. Contrary to common impressions, it does not really help the seller because he would much rather have a flexible right to cure the defect (by repair, replacement, or reduction of the price) than face a large damage claim by the buyer.
Where Does the Vienna Convention Fit into this Scheme?
It is not easy to identify the underlying philosophy of the Convention since it represents the confluence of so many streams. In the pre-war period the dominant influence was that of a handful of continental scholars led by Professor Ernst Rabel of the Max Planck Institute of Comparative Law in Berlin. Their influence was also strongly felt in the Hague Sales Conventions of 1964 although the Americans made mildly successful attempts to leaven the rigidities and propensities for categorisation found in ULIS. The American influence is also apparent in a larger number of the Vienna Convention provisions. Unhappily, the common lawyer's predilection for functionally oriented and flexible rules did not make as much headway in the remedial area as might have been wished. Instead, one detects a distinct bias in favour of the seller's position. As a member of the Canadian delegation, I do not recall many [page 129] discussions at the Vienna diplomatic conference about the need for functionalism or pragmatism in the design of the Convention rules, much less about the economist's icon of efficiency goals!
If this analysis is correct, then I think we can expect to see many departures from the default rules even where the parties have not wholly excluded the Convention. But where the parties have no written contract, or only a very skeletal one, their legal representatives, together with lawyers in the other 34 countries that have adopted the Convention to date, will have no option but to build a coherent and harmonious edifice out of the Convention rules. It will be a fascinating and challenging exercise.
FOOTNOTES
* Commentary on paper by Professor Carter appearing in this issue of the JCL at 93.
** Professor of Law, University of Toronto.
1. For the details see Ontario Law Reform, Report on Consumer Warranties and Guarantees in the Sale of Goods 1972, pp 96-100, and Report on Sale of Goods, 1979, vol 1, ch 10.
6. See the discussion in the Sale of Goods Report, above, n 1, ch 17(C).1.
7. George Priest, 'Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic Approach' (1978) 91 Harv L Rev 960.
9. [1925] 1 DLR 864 (Sask CA).
10. [1921] 1 KB 73, affd [1921] 2 KB 519.
11. White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, 3rd ed, §8.3. The authors conclude (p 357) that the Code exceptions have so eroded the perfect tender rule that relatively little is left of it.
12. John Honnold, 'Buyer's Right of Rejection' (1949) 97 U Pa L Rev 457.
14. Above, n 1. Table 1, p 462.
18. Although Professor Honnold is of the view that art 48(1) serves this office; sed qu. See Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 Convention, §296.
20. Professor Ronald Coase is a British economist and one of the founders of the law and economics movement. He joined the University of Chicago after World War II and won a Nobel prize in economics in 1990 for his pioneering work. For a description of Coase's theorem see Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, Scott, Foresman & Co, 1988, pp 5-6.
21. Law Reform Commission, New South Wales, Working Paper on the Sale of Goods, 1975, §13.17, p 220.
22. I should emphasise again that these observations are addressed to commercial contracts; a different remedial regime may be appropriate for consumer contracts.
23. Viz ss 34-5 of the Sale of Goods Act as interpreted in the case law.
Pace Law School
Institute of International Commercial Law - Last updated January 23, 2003