Go to Database
Directory || Go
to Bibliography
Published by Manz, Vienna: 1986. Reproduced with their permission.
excerpt from
Uniform Sales Law - The UN-Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods
Univ. Prof. Dr. Peter Schlechtriem [*]
(...)
The Sphere of Application
A. Initial Questions (Article 1(1)) [and Article 95]
As Article 1 indicates, the Convention applies to contracts of sale (for the
exceptions, see Articles 2-5); barter contracts are not governed by the
Convention.[41b]
The Convention combines applicability on the basis of "autonomous" requirements
[42]
with the lex fori's rules of private international law. First, under the
"autonomous" requirements, the Uniform Law for International Sales is
applicable, under Article 1(1)(a), when the parties to the contract have their
places of business - or alternatively, their habitual residence (Article 10(b)) -
in different Contracting States. The Convention, however, does not eliminate
party autonomy, since, according to Article 6, parties may opt out of the
Convention completely, either by choosing a particular domestic law or by
allowing the forum's rules of private international law to determine the
appropriate law. Second, private international law may direct the application of
the Convention when, even though the parties have their places of business in
different states, the requirement that these are Contracting States is not met.
It would then be sufficient that the forum's conflict-of-law rules point to the
law of a Contracting State. It is clear that the Convention applies in those
cases where both parties have their places of business in different Contracting
States but find themselves in a court of a non-Contracting State whose rules of
private international law point to the law of a Contracting State.[43]
Article 1(1)(b) also leads to the application of the Convention in cases when
the private international law rules of the forum state,[44]
whether or not it is a Contracting State, would apply the law of a Contracting
State, as long as the basic requirement of Article 1(1) is met, namely, that the
parties' places of business are in different states.[45] Of
course, Article 1(1)(b) considerably enlarges [page 24] the sphere of
application of the Convention.[46]
Views on the solution differ. The rule was very controversial in Vienna [47],
and the opposition to it finally led to the reservation clause in Article 95.
The pros and cons of this provision must be judged from several standpoints.
First, it is advantageous for Contracting States to apply the Uniform Law for
International Sales in international transactions not only when their own law is
applicable by virtue of Article 1(1)(a), but also when it applies by virtue of
private international law, since decisions based on the modern law of the
Convention, developed under the auspices of the United Nations and tailored to
the intricacies of international sales transactions, often will be far more
acceptable to both parties than one party's domestic law that often is entirely
alien to the other.[48]
Application of the Convention is even more desirable when the private
international law of a non-Contracting State invokes the law of a Contracting
State. Then, in effect, the court would refer to the Convention rather than to
domestic law. It would certainly be easier for the courts of non-Contracting
States to understand and apply the Convention than it would be for them to apply
the domestic sales law of a foreign country.[48a]
Finally, the fact that Contracting States are bound to apply the Convention,
even in relation to non-Contracting States which are not bound to do the same,
should not influence the appraisal of these provisions.[49] The
fact that Contracting States give more than they take cannot give rise to
serious apprehensions that this will dissuade states from signing the
Convention.
More understandable are the fears that Article 1(1)(b) could make the
Convention more difficult to apply.[49a]
For example, domestic rules of private [page 25] international law could
apply one law to the formation of the contract and a different law to the
substantive sales law. In such a case, only parts of the uniform sales law would
be applicable.[50]
However, a partial application, limited to the rights and obligations arising
from the contract already formed, should not present insurmountable obstacles
because the Convention was drafted in such a way that Part III (the substantive
sales provisions), at least, is compatible with domestic formation-of-contract
provisions.[51] The
uncertainty which may arise from the parties' choice of law should also not be
overestimated. If the parties have chosen the law of a Contracting State, then
it is a matter of interpretation whether they meant the Convention or that
state's local sales law. Moreover, not only Article 1(1)(b) gives rise to this
question. Numerous German court decisions have had to decide the meaning of
standard references to "German" law in cases where the requirements for the
application of ULIS are met.[52]
Some delegations indicated that laws in their countries already make special
provision for the regulation of foreign trade.[53]
Despite this serious concern, the majority of delegations voted for the version
of Article 1(1)(b) [54] as
formulated, but the Plenary accepted the Czechoslovakian proposal [55] to
include as a reservation clause - Article 95 - the option for Contracting States
not to enact Article 1(1)(b).[56] A
reservation under Article 95 restricts the meaning of "Contracting" in [page
26] the phrase "Contracting State" (Article 1(l)(b)). If the forum's
conflicts law invokes the law of a Contracting State that has made the
reservation, the forum must apply the domestic law of the reservation state and
not the Convention.[56a]
(...)
FOOTNOTES
* The author of this book participated at the Conference as a
member of the delegation from the Federal Republic of Germany. The views
expressed here are personal to the author and do not necessarily represent the
position of the F.R.G. or its delegation.
(...)
41b. UNCITRAL'S interest in barter and barter-like transactions
indicates that they are regarded as outside the scope of the Convention. See
Winship, Scope at 1-24; infra note 49a.
42. The question that was much debated in connection with ULIS,
namely whether that and the supplementary provision, ULIS Article 2, "excluding"
the application of private international law, really displace it, or whether it
simply leads to a "hidden application" of private law rules in regard to the
application of the uniform law, seems to be theoretical and fruitless. cf. P.
Schlechtriem, Einheitliches Kaufrecht -Wissenschaftliches Modell oder
praxisnahe Regelung? 14 et seq. (1978). See also Löwe,
Anwendungsgebiet at 13.
43. In such a case the Hague Conventions are only invoked on the
basis of domestic conflicts rules. Presumably the Convention would already be
applicable on the basis of article 1(1)(a).
44. The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to International
Sale of Movable Goods of 1955 can thus also lead to application of the
Convention. See A/Conf. 1979/C.2/SR.2 at 5 §§ 32-33 (= O.R. 440) (position
of the observer from the Hague Conference for Private International Law).
45. In cases where both parties do not have their places of
business in Contracting States, Article 1(1)(b) leads to the application of CISG
not only by the courts of Contracting States but also by courts of
non-Contracting States, provided the private international law of the
non-Contracting States makes applicable the sales law of a Contracting State
which applies Article 1(1)(b). Of course, this revives the specters which were
raised in conjunction with the Hague Conventions: If two parties with places of
business in different non-Contracting States form a contract in a Contracting
State, and if disputes then arise in a third non-Contracting State whose
conflicts rules make applicable the law of the state where the contract was
formed, the court must apply the Convention, which is alien both to the court
and to the parties. But the domestic sales law of the Contracting State would be
even more alien. It is not CISG that is the stumbling-block but rather the
weakness of the contact which determines the controlling law. The same
difficulties may arise with the Hague Conventions and on the basis of Article
1(1)(a), even though to a considerably lesser extent. See supra note 43;
contra Winship, Scope, at 1-28, 29 with references to the Secretariat's
Commentary. Compare also Volken, Lausanner Kolloquium at 28.
46. Compare Huber at 424 (approval) with Herber at 603 ("a
regrettable expansion"). cf. also Löwe, Lausanner Kolloquium at 15.
47. For the details of the discussion, see the summary
reports of the Conference.
48. See also Herber at 603 ("As a rule it is expedient for
a state that has ratified the Convention to apply it to all international sales
contracts" (translation); but cf. Honnold, Commentary § 47 (some domestic
laws are well-suited to international sales transactions).
48a. Naón fears that Article 1(1)(b) will lead to forum
shopping. This is unlikely. Forum shopping is favored by conflict-of-law rules
that give the plaintiff the choice between several domestic laws. This choice
would now include the Convention instead of the domestic law of the Contracting
State. The "unforeseeability" of the applicable law (and of the applicability of
the Convention) results rather from the uncertainty of national conflict-of-law
rules.
49. See Herber at 603; see also Herber, 1977
RIW/AWD 317.
49a. See Winship, Scope, Appendix. Winship examines 54
permutations under Article 1(1)(b) but concludes that "there are only two
questions which raise difficulties".
50. This reservation - and others - motivated the F.R.G.'s motion
to reject the proposal. See A/Conf. 97/8, S. 6 and A/Conf. 97/C.1/SR.1 at
3 (= O.R. 237). According to Huber at 423, Article 1(1)(b) modifies
internal conflicts rules and would yield the abandonment of special conflicts
rules for contract formation. This result was not intended and would have been
difficult to include in the Conference's mandate.
51. In an alternative motion (A/Conf. 97/9) (= O.R. 71 et
seq.), the F.R.G. tried to clarify that Article 1(1)(b) should refer to
conflict-of-law norms that concern the rights and obligations arising from an
already formed contract. The motion was rejected. In my view, the Convention's
provisions on the formation of contract are probably compatible with the
substantive provisions of domestic sales law, so that reference by the conflicts
rules only to the Convention's provisions on formation of contract should not
raise any insurmountable difficulties.
52. See Judgment of Dec. 4, 1985, 1986 RIW 214;
Huber at 462 note 30 (further references); Reinhart at 1-5. See
also Lausanner Kolloquium at 36 (Farnsworth).
53. See A/Conf. 97/C.1/SR.1 at 3 (= O.R. 237) (statement by
Kopác (Czechoslovakia)); A/Conf. 97/C.1/SR.1 at 5 (= O.R. 237 et seq.)
(statement by Wagner (G.D.R.)). In the G.D.R.'s International Commercial
Contracts Act § 1(2), however, there is a reservation in favor of international
conventions. Such states, when they become Contracting States, do not apply
their special foreign trade laws where the parties to a sales contract have
their places of business in a Contracting State. Moreover, if the G.D.R. and
Czechoslovakia adopt the Convention, then it will apply to sales contracts
between parties that have their places of business in these states on the basis
of Article 1(1)(a).
54. In the first Committee, the vote was 25 in favor, 7 against,
and 10 abstentions. In the Plenary there were 42 yes votes, 0 no votes and 1
abstention. A/Conf. 97/SR.6 (= O.R. 199 et seq.).
55. Attempts by Czechoslovakia in the Second Committee to
restrict the application of the Convention to contracts between parties in
Contracting States were unsuccessful. See A/Conf. 97/C.2/L.7 and L.27 (=
O.R. 145 and 152); A/Conf. 97/C.2/SR.2 at 2 et seq. (= O.R. 439).
56. Despite the reservations expressed by the F.R.G. with regard
to Article 1(1)(b), I would welcome the decision by the F.R.G. not to make this
reservation. For a convincing analysis, see Winship, Scope at 28,
Löwe, Lausanner Kolloquium at 15.
56a. Convincing Winship, Scope, at 1-27, 28.
(...)
Go to entire contents of Schlechtriem text
Pace Law School Institute of International Commercial Law -
Last updated June 9, 2000
Comments/Contributions
Go to Database
Directory || Go
to CISG Table of Contents