Reproduced with permission of 25 Journal of Law and Commerce (2005-06) 13-37
Franco Ferrari [*]
The text of the UNCITRAL Digest of Case Law on the United Nations Convention on the International Sales of Goods (Digest) relating to Article 6 CISG, not unlike the text relating to other provisions, evidences both the Digest's usefulness as well as its weaknesses.[1] As far as the former is concerned, it can easily be evinced from the number of court decisions cited in the Digest, the retrieval of which would otherwise be difficult.[2] Furthermore, the Digest is helpful as it organizes all decisions under different headings, thus making the research even easier. Also, the fact that the Digest is published in each of the six official languages of the United Nations allows it to reach more scholars and practitioners than any other instrument of interpretation. However, the use of all six official languages, albeit necessary for achieving a more global outreach, does bear some risk, namely that of certain statements drafted in one language being wrongly translated into another.
Although this appears to be a point too general to be made here, in the beginning of a number of comments on that part of the Digest that deals with Article 6 CISG, this is exactly the time and place where to make this comment, as an error in the translation from (at least) English to French did occur. Having drafted the Digest part to be discussed, I can vouch at least for what the drafter wanted to state in the English version of the relevant part of the Digest. [page 13]
The error occurred in relation to that part of the Article 6 Digest (para. 5) that deals with those cases where the CISG's application is excluded with an indication of the applicable law. According to the English version of the Digest, the applicable law is determined by virtue of the rules of private international law of the forum, which in most countries makes applicable the law chosen by the parties, at least in those countries where the 1980 Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations is to be applied. Unfortunately, the French version of the Digest refers to this solution when dealing with the cases where l'application de la Convention est exclue sans indication du droit applicable, a line of cases specifically dealt with at a later stage.
Apart from this weakness, there are other reasons why one should go beyond the Digest. These reasons can be summarized as follows: since the Digest cites many (albeit not all) decisions that deal with a specific provision, there will be cases where a contrast in case law will emerge. Pursuant to a decision taken by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law when authorizing the drafting of the Digest,[3] the Digest itself does not criticize any decision,[4] neither does it point out those cases that are worth being followed. This means, however, that ultimately the Digest is not too helpful in guiding the interpreter through the labyrinth of case law which it makes readily available. If one were to look for a guide, one would have to look elsewhere, for instance to comments by legal writers such as those made on the occasion of this Conference.
Furthermore, the Digest does not deal with all the cases that have been decided by courts in relation to a given provision. This is of course a natural consequence of there having to be a deadline for comments to be drafted in order for the Digest to be published, but it poses a problem nonetheless, as important issues may have been dealt with after the deadline for the Digest's finalization.
In respect of the Digest comments on Article 6 CISG, this is an important issue, given a very recent Italian court decision [5] which dealt with a particular problem -- namely the effect of the parties' choice to apply the CISG to [page 14] contracts to which it would otherwise not apply. Although this issue is referred to in the Article 6 Digest (para. 12), the Digest does not refer to any court decisions dealing with that issue, even though today there is case law on this issue.[6]
In the following pages, I will comment on the decisions referred to in (and missing from) the Article 6 Digest. In doing so, I will be a little more critical then when drafting those Digest comments.
II. EFFECTS OF ARTICLE 6 IN GENERAL
It is common knowledge, that even where all the CISG's requirements of applicability (international, substantive, temporal, and personal/territorial)[7] are met, the CISG does not necessarily apply,[8] since pursuant to Article 6,[9] the parties may exclude the CISG's application. Consequently, in order to decide whether the CISG is applicable, one must also look into whether it has been excluded by the parties,[10] as pointed out by several court decisions,[11] some of [page 15] which (albeit not all) are quoted in the Digest.[12] Thus, the lack of an exclusion can be regarded as a (negative) applicability requirement.[13]
By providing for this possibility, the draftsmen of the CISG reaffirmed one of the general principles already embodied in the 1964 Hague Conventions,[14] that is, the principle according to which the primary source of the rules governing international sales contracts is party autonomy,[15] which is why it is no surprise that some court decisions state that the CISG is based upon the general principle of "prevalence of party autonomy."[16] By stating [page 16] that the CISG can be excluded, the drafters clearly acknowledged the dispositive nature [17] -- emphasized also in case law [18] -- and the "central role which party autonomy plays in international commerce and, particularly, in international sales."[19]
As far as party autonomy is concerned,[20] it must be pointed out (as the Digest does in para. 3) that Article 6 CISG refers to two different lines of [page 17] cases.[21 One where the Convention's application is excluded, the other where the parties derogate from -- or modify the effects of -- the provisions of the CISG on a substantive level.[22] These two situations differ from each other in that the former does, according to the CISG, per se not encounter any restrictions,[23] as also pointed out in the Digest (para. 3), whereas the latter is limited, as there are provisions the parties are not allowed to derogate from. Where, for instance, at least one of the parties to the contract governed by the CISG has its place of business in a State that has made a reservation under Article 96, the parties may not derogate from or vary the effect of Article 12. In those cases, according to Article 12, any provision "that allows a contract of sale or its modification or termination by agreement or any offer, acceptance or other indication of intention to be made in any form other than in writing does not apply."
Although this matter has been referred to in the Digest as well (para. 3), the Digest does not conclusively deal with the effects of such a reservation, not even in its comments on Article 12. It states -- correctly -- that the effects of Article 12 lead to the principle of freedom from form requirements not being per se applicable where one party has its relevant place of business in a State that made an Article 96 declaration.[24] It then cites the contradictory views held in case law in respect of the effects of an Article 96 declaration, unfortunately without stating which view is the correct one: that according to which the sole fact that one party has its place of business in a State that made an Article 96 reservation does not necessarily mean that the form requirements of that State apply,[25] thus letting it (correctly) depend on the law to which the rules of private international of the forum lead whether any form requirements have to be met;[26] or that pursuant to which where one party has its relevant [page 18] place of business in a State that made an Article 96 reservation, the contract must necessarily be concluded or evidenced or modified in writing.[27]
It should be noted that although the Convention does not expressly mention it, there are other provisions that the parties cannot derogate from, as also pointed out by the Digest (para. 4), namely the public international law provisions (i.e. Articles 89-101) [28] As the Digest correctly states, this is due to the fact that those provisions relate to issues relevant to Contracting States rather than private parties. Even though the Digest holds that there is no case law on this point yet, it should be noted that the Tribunale di Vigevano in its rather famous decision of 12 July 2000, expressly took the view referred to in the Digest and stated that Articles 89-101 cannot be derogated from.[29] In a 2005 decision, the Tribunale di Padova not only confirmed that the parties cannot exclude the CISG's final provisions, but it also stated that the parties cannot derogate from Article 28 either.[30] In my opinion, that view is correct, as Article 28 is not directed to the parties, but rather to the courts of [page 19] Contracting States.[31] However, the aforementioned exceptions are the only ones. All other provisions can be derogated from.[32]
III. IMPLIED EXCLUSION OF THE CISG AND CHOICE OF THE APPLICABLE LAW
Party autonomy also played a very important role under the ULIS.[33] A comparison of Article 6 CISG and its "direct predecessor,"[34] Article 3 ULIS, could even lead to the conclusion that under ULIS party autonomy was more widely recognized,[35] since the ULIS expressly stated that its exclusion could also be made implicitly.[36] However, this provision was later criticized,[37] which is why the express reference to the possibility of an implicit exclusion [page 20] was not retained by the drafters of the CISG,[38] even though at the Vienna Diplomatic Conference proposals to reintroduce that express reference were made.[39] In my opinion, this does not mean that under the CISG the exclusion always has to be made expressly,[40] as, however, stated in several court decisions cited -- Once again, without any comment in the Digest,[41] as well [page 21] as in some other court decisions not cited at all.[42] This is evidenced, inter alia, by the fact that "the majority of delegations was ... opposed to the proposal according to which a total or partial exclusion of the Convention could only be made 'expressly'."[43] Consequently, the lack of express reference to the possibility of an implicit exclusion must not be regarded as precluding such possibility.[44] Rather it has a different meaning, to discourage courts from too easily inferring an 'implied' exclusion or derogation.[45] Therefore, an implicit exclusion must be regarded as possible, a view which has already been confirmed by many court decisions.[46] Some of these [page 22] decisions the Digest cites (para. 6 ff.) without commenting on, not unlike the cases holding the opposite view. Of course, there must be clear indications that the parties really wanted such an exclusion,[47] that is, there must be a real -- as opposed to theoretical, fictitious or hypothetical [48] -- agreement of exclusion.[49]
This is not a merely theoretical problem, as evidenced by the variety of ways to implicitly exclude the CISG. A typical [50] way of implicitly excluding the CISG is through the parties' choice of the applicable law.[51] There is no doubt that such a choice must be considered as being an effective exclusion [page 23] of the CISG, at least where the applicable law chosen by the parties is the law of a non-Contracting State.[52] This was true under the ULIS as well [53] and has been confirmed by a German court decision [54] cited in the Digest.
The choice of the law of a Contracting State as the law governing the contract poses more difficult problems.[55] One of these problems relates to the question of whether the CISG is applicable when the parties agree upon a national law, such as French, U.S. or Italian law, as the law applicable to their contract. As the Digest clearly shows (para. 8), the case law is contradictory on this issue as well. Since the Digest, however, simply lists the contradictory cases, once again without commenting on them, the interpreter has to look elsewhere to determine which cases should be followed.
In respect to the issue at hand, several courts,[56] as well as several legal writers,[57] suggest that the indication of the law of a Contracting State ought [page 24] to amount to an (implicit) exclusion of the CISG, because otherwise the indication of the parties would have no practical meaning.[58] In my opinion,[59] however, this solution is not tenable under the CISG,[60] not unlike under the ULIS.[61] The indication of the law of a Contracting State, if made without particular reference to the domestic law of that State,[62] as in two of the cases cited by the Digest,[63] does not per se exclude the Convention's application,[64] [page 25] as confirmed by many court decisions [65] and arbitral awards [66] cited in the [page 26] Digest. This is true even where the law chosen is that of a Contracting State that made an Article 95 reservation.[67]
The application of the Convention does not make the national law irrelevant, as suggested [68] The indication of the law of a Contracting State must be interpreted as both making the CISG applicable (as part of the chosen law) [69] and as determining the law applicable to the issues not governed by the CISG (to the extent to which the parties are allowed to make a choice in respect of those issues),[70] such as the issues relating to the validity, thus avoiding to have to resort to the complex rules of private international law in order to determine the law applicable to the issues not governed by the CISG.[71]
Quid iuris if under the 1964 Hague Conventions the parties have established practices between themselves according to which the reference to the law of a Contracting State had to be interpreted as an exclusion of the uniform sales law and the parties continue to refer to the law of that State even [page 27] after that State becomes a Contracting one to the CISG? Does the continuing reference to the law of that State have to be considered as an exclusion of the CISG? Even though several authors have argued in favor of an affirmative answer to this question,[72] most recently the opposite view was adopted by a German court.[73]
IV. EXCLUSION OF THE CISG BY VIRTUE OF STANDARD CONTRACT FORMS AND CHOICE OF FORUM
The choice of the law of a State -- whether Contracting or not -- does not constitute the sole kind of implicit exclusion which can be used to bar the Convention's application.[74] Indeed, in certain situations, and this was also true under the 1964 Hague Conventions,[75] the use of standard contract forms can lead to the exclusion of the CISG's application.[76] This is true provided that these forms become part of the contract [77] and that (a) their contents are so profoundly influenced by the rules and the concepts of a specific legal system that their use is incompatible with the CISG and implicitly manifests the parties' intention to have the contract governed by that legal system [78] and [page 28] (b) their use tends at the same time to exclude the application of the CISG as a whole.[79] Where, on the contrary, standard contract forms are intended to merely regulate specific issues in contrast with the CISG, one must presume that only a derogation of some of the CISG provisions is desired.[80]
Furthermore, as pointed out also by the Digest (para. 9), the choice of forum can lead to the exclusion of the CISG's application,[81] and the same is true with reference to the choice of an arbitral tribunal,[82] provided that two requirements are met: (a) one must be able to infer from the parties' choice their clear intention to have the domestic law of the State where the forum or arbitral tribunal is located govern their contract,[83] and (b) the forum must not be located in a Contracting State,[84] otherwise the CISG would be applicable,[85] as confirmed by two arbitral rewards referred to in the Digest.[86] [page 29]
Finally, although this possibility is nowhere referred to in the Digest, parties can exclude the CISG by agreeing that specific issues of their contract be subject to specific provisions of a law different than the CISG, provided, however, that those issues are fundamental ones [87] and that from the subjection of those issues to a domestic sales law one can infer the parties' clear intention to have the contract governed by a law different from the uniform one, as pointed out by various court decisions rendered in respect of the 1964 Hague Conventions.[88] As correctly stated in a decision referred to in the Digest (para. 11), the inclusion of Incoterms by the parties does not amount to an implicit exclusion of the CISG.[89]
V. IMPLICIT EXCLUSION AND PLEADINGS ON THE SOLE BASIS OF DOMESTIC LAW
Quid iuris where the parties argue a case on the sole basis of a domestic law despite the fact that all of the CISG's criteria of applicability are met? Although this issue is referred to in the Digest (para. 10), as there is case law on it, the Digest itself does not help to answer the question. The cases it cites are contradictory and the Digest once again does not help to solve the contradiction.
In my opinion,[90] the mere fact that the parties argue on the sole basis of a domestic law does not per se lead to the exclusion of the CISG,[91] a view recently confirmed by several courts,[92] unless the parties are aware of the CISG's applicability or the intent to exclude the CISG can otherwise be [page 30] inferred with certainty. If the parties are not aware of the CISG' s applicability and argue on the basis of a domestic law merely because they believe that this law is applicable, the judges will nevertheless have to apply the CISG on the grounds of the principle iura novit curia, provided that this principle is part of the lex fori.
One of the courts stated this very clearly:
"The fact that during the preliminary legal proceedings in this case the parties based their arguments exclusively on Italian domestic law without any references to the [CISG] cannot be considered an implicit manifestation of an intent to exclude application of the Convention. ... [R]eference in a party's brief to the non-uniform national law of a Contracting State -- even though it is theoretically some evidence of an intent to choose the national law of that State -- does not imply the automatic exclusion of the [CISG]. We will assume that the parties wanted to exclude the application of the Convention only if it appears in an unequivocal way that they recognized its applicability and they nevertheless insisted on referring only to national, non-uniform law. In the present case, it does not appear from the parties' arguments that they realized that the [CISG] was the applicable law ...; we cannot, therefore, conclude that they implicitly wanted to exclude the application of the Convention by choosing to refer exclusively to national Italian law. Thus according to the principle iura novit curia, it is up to the judge to determine which Italian rules should be applied; for the reasons mentioned above, the applicable rules are those in the Vienna Convention."[93]
In light of what has been said thus far, one has to reject the opposite view held by two tribunals (a state court [94] and an arbitral tribunal [95]) according to which pleadings on the sole grounds of domestic law automatically leads to the exclusion of the CISG.
VI. EXPRESS EXCLUSION OF THE CISG
In addition to problems concerning the CISG's implicit exclusion, problems can also arise with respect to its explicit exclusion.[96] In this respect, two lines of cases have to be distinguished: the exclusion with and the [page 31] exclusion without indication of the law applicable to the contract between the parties.[97]
Nulla quaestio in the case in which the CISG is excluded with the indication of the applicable law, indication which under the CISG can, not unlike under the Hague Conventions,[98] also be made in the course of a legal proceeding,[99] at least where this is admissible according to the lex fori,[100] as in Germany [101] and Switzerland for instance,[102] even though the parties will normally make their choice before the conclusion of the contract.[103] In this case, the judge has to apply the law chosen by the parties,[104] and it is this law on the basis of which he has to decide upon the validity of the choice of law, at least where the applicable rules of private international law correspond to those laid down in the 1980 Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations.[105] Where the parties' choice of law is invalid, the contract should [page 32] be governed by the law to be determined on the basis of the rules of private international law of the forum.[106] If this law turns out to be that of a Contracting State to the CISG, its domestic law rather than the CISG will have to be applied.[107]
Quid iuris, however, in the case of an express exclusion without indication of the applicable law, an issue also referred to in the Digest, although there is no case law on it yet?[108] In this case, the preferable view, held by most legal scholars,[109] is the one according to which "if the parties merely agree that the Convention does not apply, rules of private international law would determine the applicable domestic law."[110] And whenever these rules refer to the law of a Contracting State, its domestic sales law, not the uniform one, should apply.[111]
Undoubtedly, this rule applies in cases in which the CISG is excluded in toto.[112] However, its application to cases in which it is excluded only partially created disagreement among legal scholars.[113] Some authors favor the view according to which the issues dealt with in the excluded provisions must be [page 33] settled, according to Article 7(2) CISG, in conformity with the CISG's general principles.[114] In my opinion,[115] the better view seems to be the opposite one: the rules to substitute the excluded CISG provisions are to be determined, not unlike in the case of an exclusion in toto of the Convention, by applying the rules of private international law (of the forum State) [116] -- without resorting to the general principles of the CISG -- otherwise the exclusion would have no practical meaning. Indeed, it would make little sense to substitute specific solutions provided for by the Convention and which, therefore, are necessarily in conformity with its general principles, with solutions that are "in conformity with the general principles on which [the Convention] is based."[117]
VII. APPLICABILITY OF THE CISG AND OPTING-IN
As stated, the CISG provides for the parties' possibility of excluding (totally or partially) its application. To contrast, the Convention does not address the issue of whether the party may make the Convention applicable when it would otherwise not apply,[118] that is, where the prerequisites for application are not met.[119] [page 34]
As also pointed out in the Digest (para. 12), this issue did not arise at all under the ULIS which embodied a provision, Article 4,[120] that expressly provided for the parties' possibilityof"opting-in."[121] The fact that the drafters did not retain that express reference to the parties' possibility of opting-in should, however, not be interpreted as preventing the parties from being entitled to do so.[122] This view can be justified on the grounds that the proposal (made by the former German Democratic Republic),[123] according to which the CISG should apply even where the preconditions for its application are not met, as long as the parties wanted it to be applicable, was rejected on the sole ground that an express provision to allow such possibility was not necessary,[124] because of the already existing principle of party autonomy.[125] Most recently, this view was confirmed by a Chinese court decision which applied the CISG by virtue of the parties' opting-in to a contract for the sale [page 35] of fish powder which otherwise would have fallen outside the CISG's scope of application or its substantive scope,[126] a decision not referred to in the Digest.
As far as the significance of the parties' "opting-in" is concerned, it must be emphasized that by virtue of the "opting-in," the CISG becomes part of the contract not unlike any other contractual clause.[127] In other words, the choice of the CISG in contracts to which it would otherwise not apply does not constitute a "choice of law," as there are no private international law rules that allow such a "choice" to have a different value. Consequently, it can be presumed, that "[t]he mandatory rules of the applicable law are ... not affected by this [opting-in]."[128] Very recently, this view has been confirmed by the Tribunale di Padova in a decision of 11 January 2005,[129] a decision which the Digest does (obviously) not refer to. Referring to both the 1980 Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations as well as the 1955 Hague Convention on the law applicable to contracts for the international sale of goods, the Italian court correctly decided that the choice of the CISG as the "law" applicable to a contract in cases where the CISG would otherwise not apply cannot amount to a "choice of law," since the aforementioned conventions do not allow for a choice of law different from State law. [page 36]
Although it is not surprising that the aforementioned Italian decision is not included in the Digest, it poses the problem of how to deal with new case law, of which there is a lot. This is for sure one of the challenges UNCITRAL will face in the future. [page 37]
FOOTNOTES
5. See Tribunale di Padova, Italy, 11 Jan. 2005, available at <http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=1005&step=FullText>.
6. For a more detailed analysis of this issue, see infra text accompanying note 118 ff.
8. See FRANCO FERRARI, THE SPHERE OF APPLICATION OF THE VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 20 (1995).
11. For decisions not referred to in the Digest that also refers to the lack of exclusion as an applicability requirement, see Tribunale di Padova, supra note 5; Tribunale di Padova, Italy, 31 Mar. 2004, available at <http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=966&step=FullText>; Tribunale di Padova, Italy, 25 Feb. 2004, available at <http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=972&step=FullText>.
12. See, e.g., Tribunale di Vigevano, Italy, 12 July 2000, published in GIURISPRUDENZA ITALIANA 281 ff. (2001), also available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000712i3.html>; Oberlandesgericht Hamm, Germany, 23 June 1998, available at <http://www.jura.uni-freiburg.de/iprl/cisg/urteile/text/434.htm>; Cour d'appel Paris, France, 15 Oct. 1997, available at <http://witz.jura.uni-sb.de/CISG/decisions/151097v.htm>; Oberlandesgericht München, Germany, 9 July 1997, available at <http://www.jura.uni-freiburg.de/iprl/cisg/urteile/text/281.htm>; Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe, Germany, 25 June 1997, available at <http://www.jura.uni-freiburg.de/iprl/cisg/urteile/text/263.htm>; Oberster Gerichtshof. Austria, 11 Feb. 1997, available at <http://www.cisg.at/10_150694.htm>; Landgericht Landshut, Germany, 5 Apr. 1995, available at <http://www.jura.uni-freiburg.de/iprl/cisg/urteile/text/193.htm>; Landgericht Oldenburg, Germany, 15 Feb. 1995, available at <http://www.jura.uni-freiburg.de/iprl/cisg/urteile/text/197.htm>; Oberster Gerichtshof. Austria, 10 Nov. 1994, published in ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 79 f. (1995); Tribunal Cantonal Valais, Switzerland, 29 June 1994, published in ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WALLISER RECHTSPRECHUNG 125 (1994); Amtsgericht Nordhorn, Germany, 14 June 1994, available at <http://www.jura.uni-freiburg.de/iprl/cisg/urteile/text/259.htm>; Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe, Germany, 20 Nov. 1992, published in NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFTRECHTSPRECHUNGS -- REPORT 1316 (1993); Landgericht Düsseldorf, Germany, 9 July 1992, available at <http://www.jura.uni-freiburg.de/iprl/cisg/urteile/text/42.htm>.
16. See Tribunale di Rimini, Italy, 26 Nov. 2002, available at <http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=823&step=FullText>; Hof Beroep Gent, Belgium, 17 May 2002, available at <http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/int/tradelaw/WK/2002-05-17.htm>; Rechtbank Koophandel Ieper, Belgium, 29 Jan. 2001, available at <http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/int/tradelaw/WK/2001-01-29.htm>; Landgericht Stendal, 12 Oct. 2000, published in INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT 32 (2001).
Note, however, that even though the principle of party autonomy is widely accepted, there were some States which expressed reservations to it; "[t]heir concern was that, in practice, the principle could be abused by the economically stronger party imposing his own national law or contractual terms far less balanced than those contained in the Convention," Bonell, supra note 14, at 51; see also 1 UNCITRAL YEARBOOK 168 (1968-1970); 2 UNCITRAL YEARBOOK 43-44 (1971); 3 UNCITRAL YEARBOOK 73 (1973).
18. For an express reference to the Convention's non-mandatory nature, see Cassazione Civile, Italy, 19 June 2000, published in GIURISPRUDENZA ITALIANA 236 (2001); Oberster Gerichtshof, Austria, 21 Mar. 2000, published in INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT 41 (2001); Oberster Gerichtshof, Austria, 15 Oct 1998, published in ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 63 (1999); Handelsgericht Wien, Austria, 4 Mar. 1997, available at <http://www.cisg.at/1R4097x.htm>; Kreisgericht Wallis, Austria, 29 June 1994, published in ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WALLISER RECHTSPRECHUNG 126 (1994).
23. For this statement, see Hoyer, supra note 15, at 41.
26. Id.; Hooge Raad, Netherlands, 7 Nov. 1997, available at <http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=333&step=FullText>.
27. The High Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation, 16 Feb. 1998, available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980216r2.html>; Rechtbank van Koophandel Hasselt, Belgium, 2 May 1995, available at <http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/int/tradelaw/WK/1995-05-02.htm>.
29. See Tribunale di Vigevano, Italy, 12 July 2000, available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000712i3.html>.
30. Tribunale di Padova, Italy, 11 Jan. 2005, available at <http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=1005&step=FullText>.
Arguably, however, article 28 differs from most of the Convention's provisions because it deals directly with a court's power and discretion to grant injunctive relief. In this way, article 28 is more like article 12, regarding domestic statutes of frauds. Article 12 is expressly exempted from the contractual waiver power in article 6. The parties cannot agree to be bound by an oral modification if any party has its principal place of business in a Contracting State that has preserved its own statute of frauds under article 96. Similarly, one may argue, the parties cannot require specific performance when the court would not otherwise grant it under article 28. On balance, however, article 6 should be interpreted to permit waiver of article 28. First, only article 12, not article 28, is expressly exempted from article 6. Furthermore, the Convention's drafters reasonably might have concluded that the domestic policies supporting a statute of frauds are more significant than those protecting a court's discretion to deny specific performance.
Id. (citations omitted).
32. Thus, it cannot surprise that a court has recently stated that Article 55, relating to open-price contracts, is only applicable where the parties have not agreed to the contrary. See Cour d'appel Grenoble, France, 26 Apr. 1995, available at <http://witz.jura.uni-sb.de/CISG/decisions/2604952v.htm>. Neither is a court decision surprising which expressly states that Article 39, relating to the notice requirement, is not mandatory and can be derogated from. See Landgericht Giessen, Germany, 5 July 1994, published in NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT RECHTSPRECHUNGS-REPORT 438 (1995). To make another example, according to the Austrian Supreme Court, Article 57 also can be derogated from. See Oberster Gerichtshof, Austria, 10 Nov. 1994, published in ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 79 ff. (1995).
34. Bonell, supra note 19, at 17.
35. This has already been pointed out by Carbone & Luzzatto, supra note 17, at 132.
37. See 1 UNCITRAL YEARBOOK 168 (1968-1970).
See also Arthur Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 265, 281 (1984), where the author criticizes the draftsmen who, although they could have foreseen the problems which the lack of an express reference to the possibility of implicitly excluding the Convention would cause, "chose to provide little guidance."
42. See BP Oil Int'l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 323 F. 3d 333 (5th Cir. 2003), available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030611u1.html>; Ajax Tool Works, Inc. v. Can-Eng Mfg. Ltd., No. 01 C 5938, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1306 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2003), available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030129u1.html>; St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Neuromed Med. Sys. & Support, No. 00 Civ. 9344(SHS), 2002 WL 465312, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002).
For a similar conclusion, see also Isaak I. Dore, Choice of Law under the International Sales Convention: A U.S. Perspective, 77 AM.J. INT'L L. 521,532 (1981); Caroline D. Klepper, The Convention for the International Sale of Goods: A Practical Guide for the State of Maryland and Its Trade Community, 15 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 235, 238 (1991); Murphy, supra note 9, at 728; Robert S. Rendell, The New U.N. Convention on International Sales Contracts: An Overview, 15 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 23,25 (1989).
46. See Tribunale di Padova, Italy, 11 Jan. 2005, available at <http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=1005&step=FullText>; Tribunale di Padova, Italy, 31 Mar. 2004, available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040331i3.html>; Tribunale di Padova, Italy, 25 Feb. 2004, available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040225i3.html>; Tribunale di Rimini, Italy, 26 Nov. 2002, available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021126i3.html>; Oberster Gerichtshof, Austria, 22 Oct. 2001, available at <http://www.cisg.at/1_7701g.htm>; Cour de Cassation, France, 26 June 2001, available at <http://witz.jura.uni-sb.de/CISG/decisions/2606012v.htm>; Tribunale di Vigevano, Italy, 12 July 2000, published in GIURJSPRUDENZA ITALIANA 281 (2001); Oberlandesgericht Dresden, Germany, 27 Dec. 1999, available at <http://www.jura.uni-freiburg.de/iprl/cisg/urteile/text/511.htm>; Oberlandesgericht München, Germany, 9 July 1997, available at <http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/urteile/282.htm>; Landgericht München, Germany, 29 May 1995, published in NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 401 (1996); Oberlandesgericht Celle, Germany, 24 May 1995, available at <http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/urteile/152.htm>.
Note, however, that according to Murphy, supra note 9, at 749, the possibility of implicitly excluding the CISG contrasts with the need for certainty of law.
53. See Herber, supra note 33, at 20.
See, however, Rechtbank Koophandel Tongeren, Belgium, 18 Mar. 1976, in INTERNATIONALE RECHTSPRECHUNG ZU EKG UND EAG 136 f. (Peter Schlechtriem & Ulrich Magnus eds., 1987); Rechtbank Koophandel Tongeren, Belgium, 9 June 1977, in INTERNATIONALE RECHTSPRECHUNG ZU EKG UND EAG 138.
56. See Cour d'Appel Colmar, France, 26 Sept. 1995, available at <http://witz.jura.uni-sb.de/CISG/decisions/260995.htm>; Kammergericht Zug, Germany, 16 Mar. 1995, published in INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT 44 (2000); Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal Florence, 19 Apr. 1994, published in DIRITTO DEL COMMERCIO INTERNAZIONALE 861 (1994); Tribunale di Monza, Italy, 14 Jan. 1993, published in FORO ITALIANO 916 (1994).
For a reference to the rejection of the foregoing proposals as argument in favor of the view expressed in the text, see also Bonell, supra note 14, at 56; MAGNUS, supra note 15, at 106.
For further examples of clauses that successfully exclude the Convention's application, see B. Blair Crawford, Drafting Considerations under the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 8 J.L. & COM. 193 (1988); E. Allen Farnsworth, Review of Standard Forms or Terms under the Vienna Convention, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 442 (1988); Herber, supra note 14, at 87; Holthausen, supra note 40, at 515; David L Perrott, The Vienna Convention 1980 on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, INTERNATIONAL CONTRACT LAW AND FINANCE REVIEW 580 (1980); PILTZ, supra note 17, at 48; Winship, supra note 40, at 1.35.
63. Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt, Germany, 30 Aug. 2000, available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000830g1.html>; Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt, Germany, 15 Mar. 1996, available at <http://www.jura.uni-freiburg.de/iprl/cisg/urteile/text/284.htm>.
65. Hof van Beroep Gent, Belgium, 17 May 2002, available at <http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/int/tradelaw/WK/2002-05-17.htm>; Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt, Germany, 30 Aug. 2000, available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000830g1.html>; Bundesgerichtshof, Germany, 25 Nov. 1 998, published in TRANSPORTRECHT-INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT 18 (1999); Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, Germany, 5 Oct. 1998, available at <http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/urteile/473.htm>; Kantongericht Nidwalden, Switzerland, 3 Dec. 1997,published in TRANSPORTRECHT-INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT 10 (1999); Bundesgerichtshof, Germany, 25 June 1997, available at <http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/urteile/277.htm>; Oberlandesgericht München, Germany, 9 July 1997, available at <http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/urteile/281.htm>; Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe, Germany, 25 June 1997, available at <http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/urteile/263.htm>; Handelsgericht Kanton Zurich, Switzerland, 5 Feb. 1997, available at <http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/urteile/327.htm>; Cour de Cassation, France, 17 Dec. 1 996, available at <http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/urteile/220.htm>; Landgericht Kassel, Germany, 15 Feb. 1996, published in NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT RECHTSPRECHUNGS-REPORT 1146 (1996); Oberlandesgericht Hamm, Germany, 9 June 1995, published in RECHTDER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 689 (1996); Arrondissementsrechtbank Gravenhage, Netherlands, 7 June 1995, available at <http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=154&step=FullText>; Oberlandesgericht München, Germany, 8 Feb. 1995, available at <http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/urteile/142.htm>; Oberlandesgericht Köln, Germany, 22 Feb. 1995, published in PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS 393 ff. (1995); Oberlandesgericht Koblenz, Germany, 17 Sept. 1993, published in RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 934 (1993); Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, Germany, 8 Jan. 1993, published in RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 325 (1993).
66. See Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, Arbitral Award No. 9187, June 1999, available at <http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=466&step=Fu11Text> (CISG applicable pursuant to the choice of French law, i.e., the law of a Contracting State); Schiedsgericht der Handelskammer Hamburg, Germany, 21 Mar. 1996, published in MONATSSCHRIFT FÜR DEUTSCHES RECHT 781 (1996) (applying the CISG on the grounds that the choice of the Hamburg arbitral tribunal was to be analogized to the choice of German law, i.e., that of a Contracting State); Court of Arbitration of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 17 Nov. 1995, available at <http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=217&step=FullText> (stating that the CISG was applicable, among others, because the parties had chosen the law of two (!) Contracting States as the law governing the contract); Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, Arbitral Award No. 8324, 1995, published in JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1019 (1996) (applying the CISG to a contract which the parties had subjected to French law, i.e., the law of a Contracting State); Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, Arbitral Award No. 7844, 1994, published in ICC COURT OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN 72 (1995) (stating that the CISG is applicable where the parties have chosen the law of a Contracting State to govern their international sales contract); Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, Arbitral Award No.7660, 23 Aug. 1994, published in ICC COURT OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN 68 (1995) (holding that the CISG was applicable on the grounds that the parties had agreed upon the law of a Contracting State (Austria) as the law governing their contract and that the choice of the law or a Contracting State included the CISG); Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, Arbitral Award No. 7565, published in ICC COURT OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN 64 (1995) (applying the CISG to a contract to which the parties had made applicable "the laws of Switzerland" based upon the argument that "Swiss law, when applicable, consists of the Convention itself as of the date of its incorporation into Swiss law"); Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, Arbitral Award No. 6653, published in JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1040 (1993) (applying the CISG to a contract which the parties had agreed upon to subject to French law, the law of a Contracting State to the CISG); Internationales Schiedsgericht der Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft -- Wien, Austria, Arbitral Award No. SCH-4366, 15 June 1994, published in RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 590 (1995) (expressly stating that "the parties' choice of the law of a Contracting State is understood as a reference to the corresponding national law, including the CISG as the international sales law of that State and not merely to the -- non-unified -- domestic sales law").
When a state participates in the Convention the latter can be assumed to be part of his domestic law so that additional reference to it could be considered as superfluous at first, and/or for the reference to make sense, as an exclusion of the CISG. But the application of the Convention does in no way make the application of the other parts of the national law irrelevant. ... Therefore, it must be recommended to the parties to determine the national law that is applicable in addition to the Convention ... so that they can avoid the uncertainties involved in determining that law, using the conflict-of-law norms.
72. See, e.g., FERRARI, supra note 17, at 118; Holthausen, supra note 40, at 516.
77. See SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 19, at 14.
[T]he use of general conditions or of standard form contracts whose content is influenced by principles and rules typical of the domestic law of a particular State, is certainly an element from which one could infer the intention of the parties to have that domestic law rather than the Convention govern their contract. Before reaching such a conclusion, however, due consideration should be given to other circumstances of the case.
This view is shared by other authors as well; see, e.g., AUDIT, supra note 15, at 39; Ulrich Huber, Der UNCITRAL-Entwurfeines Übereinkommens über internationale Warenkaufverträge, RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 426 (1979); SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 19, at 21.
For practical applications of the aforementioned tendency, see Tzotrzis v. Monard Line A/B, [1968] W.L.R. 406, 411-12 (C.A); Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 14 n. 15 (1972).
82. For this conclusion, see Holthausen, supra note 40, at 517-18; MAGNUS, supra note 15, at 140-41.
89. Oberster Gerichtshof, Austria, 22 Oct. 2001, available at <http://www.cisg.at/1_7701g.htm>.
90. See Ferrari, supra note 55, at 744 ff.
91. For this conclusion, see SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 19, at 14.
92. See Tribunale di
Padova, Italy, 25 Feb. 2004, available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040225i3.html>;
Landgericht Saarbrücken, Germany, 2 July 2002, available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020702g1.html>; Oberlandesgericht Rostock, Germany, 10 Oct. 2001, available at
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/011010g1.html>; Tribunale di Vigevano, Italy, 12 July 2000,
published in GIURISPRUDENZA ITALIANA 281 (2001); Oberlandesgericht Hamm, Germany,
9 June 1995, published in PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND
VERFAHRENSRECHTS 269 (1996); Landgericht Landshut, Germany, 5 Apr. 1995, available
at <http://www.jura.uni-freiburg.de/iprl/cisg/urteile/text/l193.htm>. 97. For this distinction, see FERRARI, supra note 17, at 121. For judicial applications of this principle, see Bundesgerichtshof, Germany, 26 Nov. 1980, published in NEUEIURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1156 (1981);
Bundesgerichtshof; Germany, 26 Oct. 1983, published in RECHT DER
INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 151 (1984). 101. Oberlandesgericht Köln, Germany, 26 Aug. 1994, available at <http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/urteile/132.htm>; Oberlandesgericht Saarbrücken, Germany, 13 Jan. 1993, available at
<http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/urteile/83.htm>. 103. In this respect, it has been stated that: One might expect that, in practice, the parties would normally indicate their intention at the
beginning of their negotiations, or at least before the contract is concluded. Nonetheless, there is
nothing to prevent them from deciding at a later stage, even after the initiation of a legal proceeding
relating to their contract. ... It should, however, be borne in mind that any exclusion of or derogation
from the Convention agreed upon after the conclusion of the contract amounts to a modification
of the contract, which in some cases may require a particular form. Bonell, supra note 14, at 58. 104. For this solution see also Sacerdoti, supra note 17, at 746. 112. For this affirmation, see Bonell, supra note 14, at 59. 113. For a recent overview of the discussion on this issue, see MAGNUS, supra note 15, at 142-43. 115. See FERRARI, supra note 17, at 122. 116. Compare also FERRARI, supra note 14, at 180.
The situations may be different if the parties agree to submit the disputes arising from their contract
to arbitration. Arbitrators are not necessarily bound by a particular domestic law. This is self-evident, if they are authorized by the parties to decide ex aequo et bono. ... But even in the absence
of such an authorization there is a growing tendency to permit arbitrators to base their decisions
on principles and rules different from those adopted by State courts. This tendency has recently
received a significant confirmation by the Uncitral Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, where it is expressly stated that '[t]he arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in
accordance with such rules of law as are chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of
the dispute' (Article 28(1)). ... Following this approach the parties to an international contract would
be free to indicate in the Convention the 'rules of law' according to which the arbitrators shall
decide any dispute, with the result that the Convention would directly apply regardless of whether
or not the positive and negative conditions for this application are fulfilled in the single case. Id. The present law shall also apply where it has been chosen as the law of the contract by the parties,
whether or not their places of business or their habitual residences are in different States and
whether or not such States are Parties to the Convention dated the 1st day of July 1964 relating
to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, to the extent that it does not affect the
application of any mandatory provisions of the law which would have been applicable if the parties had not chosen the Uniform Law. Id. Although the conference rejected an amendment which would have expressly permitted parties to
derogate from Articles 2 and 3 the debate suggests that delegations could not agree on how to
express the limitations on party autonomy required by 'mandatory' national laws. Parties should not
be foreclosed, therefore, from agreeing to have the convention apply to a transaction otherwise excluded as long as the policy behind the specific exclusion is not contravened. Id. 126. See Xiamen Intermediate People's Court, People's Republic of China, 5 Sept. 1994,
available at <http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=211&step=Abstract> 127. For a similar statement, see AUDIT, supra note 15, at 40.
128. ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 47, at 51. For a similar conclusion, see Bonell, supra note 19, at 19 (stating that the result of the parties' "opting-in" "will be that the individual provisions of the Convention like any other contractual teffi1
may bind the parties only to the extent that they are not contrary to mandatory rules of the proper law of contract, i.e., the domestic law which by virtue of the rules of private international law of the forum governs the transaction in question"); Horacio Grigera Naon, The UN Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, in 2 THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 101 (Norbert Horn & Clive M. Schmitthoff eds., 1982) (stating the same); HERBER & CZERWENKA, supra note 40, at 45 (stating the same); HONNOLD, supra note 49, at 87 (stating that "[r]ules of domestic law that are 'mandatory' are not disturbed when the Convention becomes applicable by virtue of an agreement by the parties"); MAGNUS, supra note 15, at Ill; Sacerdoti, supra note 17, at 746 (stating the same). Note, however, that a similar statement had already been made at the Vienna Conference; see Records, supra note 39, at 252, reporting the Egyptian delegate's statement: [T]he draft amendment was an attractive one but was unnecessary because of the principle of the autonomy of the will of the parties. If the latter agreed to apply the Convention, even in cases where it would noffi1ally not apply, their wish should be respected. Naturally, if the applicable law did not admit certain provisions of the Convention, that law would prevail. But it was not for the Convention to settle that question. 129. See Tribunale di Padova, Italy, 11 Jan. 2005, available at <http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=1005&step=FullText>.
Pace Law School
Institute of International Commercial Law - Last updated October 3, 2006
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